

18 September 1980

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Acting Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]

Director, PHOTINT Tasking Office

SUBJECT: Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP)

REFERENCE: D/DCI/RM Memo to DCI, Same Subject,
dtd 17 September 1980

1. The referenced memorandum was not coordinated with the PTO, and I do not know if other CT\$ elements saw it. I believe that it reflects a misunderstanding of the intent and the practical consequences of the DRSP in concept and the implications of the current status of the DRSP.

2. There are, of course, some legitimate DoD concerns about national support to military operational forces which serve as an impetus to this project. We must recognize also that the Secretary of Defense has authority and responsibility to meet those needs. On the other hand, there are many ways for DoD to address those needs without undercutting the DCI responsibilities and authorities. The DRSP is not a benign structure. It is, by design in my opinion, a structure that will severely erode centralized management of the most expensive and most important element of the national intelligence capability.

3. The practical consequences, in the near term, of the DRSP will be to reduce the availability of NRO manpower to service the NRP. The program offices will have their assigned personnel and contractors directed to work on options for modification and augmentation of national systems. The program offices, certainly Program A, will be directed to use their resources to work on DRSP proposals. This will mean a degradation of the quality of support to the operating NRO systems. I could go on to spell this out in greater detail to cover a period of 5-10 years but that is not necessary. The irresistible temptation to raid the NRO resources is too obvious to require detailed explanation.

4. The other point to note is the long-term erosion of the DCI authorities and the concept of centralized management of the expensive NRO resources. I am not alarmed by change per se, but I am alarmed by the inefficiencies and increased national expense implicit in this proposal. The correspondence on this subject leaves me with the impression that we are simply accepting the inevitability of the DRSP as presently defined. This is not inevitable. It can and should be resisted in its present form.

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WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

* NRO review(s)
completed.

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5. I recommend that the DCI be urged to marshal a major effort by CTS, RMS, OGC, and OLC to resist the DREF. The project should be organized to run over a 3-6 month period, involve the PRC(I) and the Congress, and a considerable investment of time by the DCI.

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The memo by 
that I mentioned to you.
Remember you aren't supposed
to have seen it.

